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6Will India Become a Superpower?
 Ramachandra Guha
More than sixty years ago, in the summer of 1948, the Indian nation, then newly-born, was struggling for its very survival. It was pierced from the left by the Communists, and pinched 
from the right by Hindu extremists. And there were other problems aplenty. Eight million refugees 
had to be resettled; provided with land, homes, employment and a sense of citizenship. Five 
hundred princely states had to be integrated, one by one, a process that involved much massaging 
of egos (for the Maharajas tended to think very highly of themselves), and just a little coercion. 
Few Indians now alive know how uncertain our future looked in the summer of 1948. The question then 
being asked everywhere was ‘Will India Survive?’. Now, sixty-four years down the road, that fearful query 
has been replaced by a far more hopeful one, namely, ‘Will India Become a Superpower?’. 
This new, anticipatory, expectant question has been prompted by the extraordinary resilience, in the 
long term, of India’s democratic institutions. When the fi rst General Elections were held, in 1952, they 
were dubbed the ‘Biggest Gamble in History’. Never before had universal adult franchise been tried 
in a poor, divided, and largely illiterate society. Evidently, it is a gamble that has worked. The country 
has successfully held fi fteen General Elections to the national Parliament, as well as countless polls to 
different state assemblies. Rates of voter participation are often higher than in Western democracies. 
And after what happened in Florida in 2000, we can add that the conduct of polls is at least as fair. 
Back in 1948, doubts were also being cast about the Indian experiment with nationhood. Never before 
had a new nation not based its unity on a single language, religion, or common enemy. As an inclusive, 
plural, and non-adversarial model of nationalism, the idea of India had no precedent or imitator.
In the words of the political theorist Sunil Khilnani, India has been ‘a substantial bridgehead of effervescent 
liberty on the Asian continent’. As such, it inspires hope that the largely poor, still divided, and formerly 
colonised countries of Africa and the Middle East can likewise move towards a more democratic political 
system. Meanwhile, through its collective co-existence of different faiths, languages, cultures, and cuisines, 
India is a better model for world governance than more homogeneous countries such as China, Japan, 
or the United States. Once, the heterogeneity of India was seen as its greatest fl aw; now, it may justly 
be celebrated as its greatest strength.
India was not expected to survive as a democracy nor hold together as a single nation; but it has. These 
manifest successes, achieved against the odds and against the logic of human history, have compelled 
worldwide admiration. If calls are now being heard that India must be made a Permanent Member of the 
Security Council of the United Nations, then these demands are not just legitimate, but also overdue. It 
is India’s long-term record as a stable, multicultural democracy that lies behind its claims for a place at 
the High Table of Global Affairs. But if politics were all, then we would not be asking whether India will 
become a superpower. That question is prompted also by the spectacular success, in the short-term, of 
the Indian economy, the impressive growth rates of the past decade, the entrepreneurial drive manifest 
in such crucial, cutting-edge sectors such as information technology, and the creation of an ever larger 
and ever more confi dent middle class.
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Superfi cially, India seems to have travelled a long 
way from the summer of 1948. Now – despite the 
dissensions in the borderlands, in Kashmir and the 
north-east – it is clear that India is and will be a single 
country, whose leaders shall be chosen by (and also 
replaced by) its people. Indians no longer fear for our 
existence as a sovereign nation or as a functioning 
democracy. What we hope for instead is a gradual 
enhancement of our material and political powers, 
and the acknowledgement of our nation as one of 
the most powerful and respected on earth.
But, the more things appear to change, the more they 
are actually the same. For today, the Indian state once 
more faces a challenge from left-wing extremism. 
The Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, 
has identifi ed the Communist Party of India (Maoist), 
known more familiarly as the Naxalites, as the ‘greatest 
internal security threat‘ facing the nation. The Home 
Ministry lists more than 150 districts as being ‘Naxalite 
affected’. This is an exaggeration, for with even one 
single, stray incident, a State Government is moved 
to get a district listed under that category, so as to 
garner more funds from the Central treasury. Still, the 
Naxalites do have a considerable presence in some 
forty or fi fty districts spread out over the central and 
eastern parts of the country. Their greatest gains have 
been among tribal communities treated with contempt 
and condescension by the Indian state and by the 
formal processes of Indian democracy.
The conventional wisdom is that the erstwhile 
Untouchables, or Dalits, are the social group who 
are most victimised in India. In fact, the tribals fare 
even worse.  In a recent book, the demographer Arun 
Maharatna compared the life chances of an average 
Dalit with that of an average tribal. On all counts 
the tribals were found to be more disadvantaged. 
As many as 41.5 percent of Dalits live below the 
offi cial poverty line; however, the proportion of poor 
tribal households is even higher, at 49.5 percent. 
One-in-six Dalits have no access to doctors or 
health clinics; as many as one-in-four tribals suffer 
from the same disability.
In 2006, I visited the districts of Dantewara and Bastar 
in the state of Chhattisgarh. Here a civil war was 
under way between the Naxalites and a vigilante 
group promoted by the State Government. The 
revolutionaries identify with the tribals in the short-
term, fi ghting for better wages for forest work and 
against their harassment by petty offi cials. Their long-
term goal, however, is the capture of political power 
by armed struggle. In this the tribals are merely as a 
stepping-stone, or, one might say, cannon fodder. 
The Maoists use violence regularly and recklessly. 
Policemen are slaughtered in their police stations; 
civilians killed by land mines set off on main roads. 
Their treatment of dissenters is especially savage; these 
are tried in ‘peoples courts’ and then sentenced to 
amputation or death. 
When I was in Bastar, the Nepali Maoists had just 
declared a cease-fi re. Their leader, Prachanda, had 
gone so far as to say that multi-party democracy was 
the political system most suited to the twenty-fi rst 
century. I put it to a Naxalite ideologue we met that 
perhaps they could think of emulating their Nepali 
comrades. He was contemptuous of the suggestion. 
He insisted that in India bourgeois democracy was a 
sham; here, the state had to be overthrown through 
the use of force. 
Tragically, the vicious and violent methods of 
the Maoists have been reproduced by the State 
Government of Chhatisgarh. They set up a vigilante 
army called ‘Salwa Judum’, composed of tribal youths 
equipped with rifl es. Bands of vigilantes roamed the 
Bastar countryside accompanied by the police and 
paramilitary, in search of Naxalite sympathisers, alleged 
or real. They attacked dozens of villages and burnt 
hundreds of homes. They killed many innocent people 
and terrorised many others and in the process greatly 
increased the level of violence in Dantewara. Villagers 
were forced to choose one side or the other. Those 
who hesitated to join the vigilantes were savagely set 
upon. The Salwa Judum and the State Government 
between them forcibly uprooted some 50,000 
villagers and put them in camps along the main roads.
8An atmosphere of fear and terror pervaded the 
district. Families, clans, tribes and villages were divided 
by the civil war. The majority of villagers were not 
interested in this fi ght at all. They were dragged 
into it by the Maoists on the one side and the Salwa 
Judum on the other.
Salwa Judum is a model of how not to fi ght left-wing 
extremism. The menace of Naxalism can be tamed and 
tackled in two ways: by prompt and effi cient policing, 
and by providing the tribals a greater share in political 
power and in the fruits of economic development. 
Unhappily, even tragically, the tribals have become the 
main victims of economic globalisation. In the days 
when the state occupied the commanding heights 
of the Indian economy, these Adivasis lost their lands 
and livelihoods to hydroelectric power plants and 
commercial forestry schemes. Now, they lose their 
lands and livelihoods to mining projects which excavate 
the vast amounts of iron ore and bauxite found on or 
under land the tribals live on, but whose ownership 
(or rights of disposal) are claimed by the state. Non-
tribal politicians hand over these resources to large 
fi rms, foreign and Indian, in exchange for a share of 
the proceeds. All that the tribals get, in exchange, 
is dispossession. 
In naming themselves after Mao Zedong, the Naxalites 
hope to do in this country what that Chinese 
revolutionary accomplished in his – that is to say, to 
build a single-party dictatorship that calls itself, in 
Orwellian fashion, a ‘Peoples Democracy’. This dream is 
a fantasy, but, since the Maoists are determined to play 
it out, a bloody war of attrition lies ahead. The Indian 
state will neither be able to easily recapture the hearts 
and minds of the Adivasi, nor authoritatively reassert 
its control in the territories where the extremists are 
now active. At the same time, if the Maoists try to 
move into the open country, they will be mowed 
down by the Indian Army. But in the hills and forests 
of central India, the confl ict will persist, without any 
side claiming a decisive victory. In the next decade, 
thousands of lives will be lost, some of policemen, 
others of Naxalites, the majority perhaps of Adivasis 
caught in the cross-fi re.
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There is then this serious threat posed by left-wing 
Communist extremism. And – as in 1948 – there is 
also a serious threat offered by right-wing religious 
fundamentalism. However, while the Maoists are 
implacably opposed to the Indian Constitution, the 
religious bigots work within the democratic process, 
seeking to divert and distort it. Their ideology, known 
as ‘Hindutva’, argues for the construction of a Hindu 
theocratic state in India.
The threat to India from religious bigotry was at its 
most intense from about 1989 to about 2004. The 
campaign to construct a Ram temple in the northern 
town of Ayodhya brought together a large number 
of believers spread across the country, by no means 
representing the majority of Hindu public opinion, but 
still large enough to provoke a series of communal 
riots (in which the main victims were Muslims), and 
to bring the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 
many States and, eventually, in the Centre. 
Back in 1968, the scholar-statesman C. Rajagopalachari 
observed that the Jana Sangh (the predecessor of 
today’s BJP) was a party which ‘has quite a few good 
leaders’. Then he added: ‘What is needed however is 
a broadmindedness that not just practices toleration 
but looks upon Mussalmans, Christians, Parsis 
and others as politically and culturally as good as 
Hindus’. Four decades later, Indians still wait for that 
broadening of Hindutva minds. Perhaps the wait has 
been in vain. For in its origins and core beliefs, the 
BJP and its sister organisations, such as the Rashtriya 
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), are motivated by values 
and ideals that are antithetical to those of modern, 
secular, liberal democracy. 
Some commentators use the term ‘Hindu nationalists’ 
to characterise the members and leaders of the 
BJP and RSS. It is a label that we must reject. How 
can they be called ‘nationalists’ when they would 
withhold full citizenship from those Indians who 
are Muslims or Christians or Parsis or atheists? The 
correct characterisation of their ideology, therefore, is 
‘Hindu chauvinist’.
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divisive has been demonstrated in the hundreds of 
reports published by civil liberties groups, extending over 
four decades and covering at least a dozen states, that 
document their hand in communal riots big and small. 
Although they work within the Indian Constitution 
they are, in effect, as opposed to its underlying ideals 
as are the Maoists. 
To be fair, there are also other kinds of religious 
fundamentalisms lurking around in India. Some 
Christian and Muslim groups in India are as convinced 
of their theological superiority, as sure of their victory 
at the altar of history, as any bigot of the RSS. There 
is, indeed, a reassertion of religious orthodoxy in all 
faiths in modern India – among Muslims and Christians 
as well as Sikhs and Hindus (and even, as it happens, 
among Jains). It is the illiberal tendencies in all these 
religions that, at the present juncture, are in the 
ascendant. But simply by virtue of numbers – Hindus 
are, after all, more than 80 percent of India’s population 
– and their much wider political infl uence, Hindu 
bigotry is indisputably the most dangerous of them all.
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The political history of the modern world can be 
written in terms of a three-way contest. On the left, 
there are varieties of socialist or communist extremism. 
On the right, there are varieties of national or religious 
fanaticism. Placed in the middle are the forces of 
liberal, constitutional democracy. When the centre is 
fragile, as in Russia in 1917 or in Germany in 1933, 
one or other form of extremism will triumph. When 
the centre is resolute, as in India in 1948, liberal 
democracy can consolidate itself.
Indians less than seventy years of age – that is to 
say, ninety-eight Indians out of one hundred – are 
insuffi ciently aware of, and possibly insuffi ciently 
grateful to, the great democrats and patriots who, 
back in the late 1940s, successfully stood their ground 
against the challenges of revolutionary communism 
and religious fundamentalism. Nehru, Patel, Ambedkar, 
Rajagopalachari, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, and 
others, working together, made sure that the Centre 
held, that the princely states were integrated, that 
the refugees were resettled, that the Hindu extremists 
and the Communist insurrectionists were tamed and 
conquered. They united a diverse and fragmented 
country, and then gave it a democratic, plural, federal, 
and republican Constitution. 
Who, now, are the Indians who shall hold the Centre 
against the challenges from left and right? Here 
lies a fundamental difference between the India of 
1948 and the India of today. Then, the Government 
was run by men and women of proven intelligence 
and integrity, who were deeply committed to the 
values and procedures of democracy. Now, the 
Government of India is run by men and women of 
limited intelligence and dubious integrity, who know 
little about and care less for the ideals on which the 
Republic was founded.
The current state of Indian politics is exemplifi ed above 
all by the state of the Indian National Congress, which 
was once the vehicle of a great, countrywide, freedom 
struggle, but is now merely a vehicle for the ambitions 
of a single family. In the 1970s, Mrs Indira Gandhi 
destroyed the Congress organisation. Her successors 
have since rid the party of any vestiges of liberal or 
progressive thought. The terms that came to mind 
in characterising an earlier generation of Congress 
leaders were: patriotic, effi cient, social democratic, 
incorruptible. The terms that come to mind now are: 
selfi sh, nepotistic, sycophantic, on the make. 
However, the decline and degradation of the Congress 
is symptomatic of the decline and degradation of 
public life in general. Other, lesser, parties have taken 
inspiration from the Congress and converted their 
parties into family fi rms.  These include the DMK in 
Tamil Nadu, the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, the Akali Dal 
in Punjab, and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, 
all of which are controlled by a single family, with the 
leadership passing from father to son.
In the year 1948 or thereabouts, it was not just 
the politicians who were patriotic and incorruptible 
– the civil servants were, too. Without the work, 
for example, of Sardar Tarlok Singh in resettling 
refugees, or of Sukumar Sen in organising our 
fi rst, defi nitive, General Elections, or of V. P. Menon 
in integrating the princely states, there would be 
no India, still less a united and democratic one. 
The example they set was carried forward down the 
line – much as the example set by Nehru and company 
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was deepened by provincial Congress leaders, most 
of whom were likewise capable and effi cient. Now, 
however, unelected offi cials at times surpass elected 
politicians in the scale and ambition of their corruption.
Today, the Centre is corrupt, corroded. Fortunately, 
the sense of Indian nation-hood cultivated over sixty 
decades has struck deep roots. India is not about to 
become a Hindu state. Nor is India about to become 
a one-party Maoist regime either. It is striking that 
the Naxalites have tried hard, but wholly without 
success, to impose a poll boycott in areas where they 
have infl uence. The habit, once acquired, of voting 
freely to choose one’s representatives is impossible 
to shake off.
India remains a single nation. It continues to hold 
regular elections, permit the free movement of 
citizens, and encourage a moderately free press. But 
with a corrupt and corroded Centre, Indian democracy 
will not be able to win an authoritative victory over 
extremists of left or right. 
The decline in the quality and capability of our 
politicians and public offi cials has been compensated, 
in part, by the rise of a vigorous and very active civil 
society. Back in the 1950s, there were a few dedicated 
social workers working in the Gandhian tradition, such 
as Thakurdas Bang, Baba Amte, Mridula Sarabhai, and 
Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay. At that time however, 
hopes for reform and uplift were mostly entrusted 
to the state.
By the early 1970s, it became clear that the state 
was unwilling or unable to take on these larger 
responsibilities. In 1972, a Gujarati woman named 
Ela Bhatt started the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association. The next year a Garhwali man of 
peasant extraction who shared her surname started 
the Chipko movement. These two Bhatts, Ela and 
Chandi Prasad, were in the vanguard of a much larger 
wave of voluntary action on behalf of the poor and 
marginalised of India. Through the 1970s and 1980s, 
hundreds of citizens’ groups came into being, which 
sought to open schools and clinics for the rural and 
urban poor; to run co-operatives for farmers and 
craftspeople; to plant trees, revive village water tanks, 
and otherwise restore a ravaged environment. 
Admittedly, many Indian NGOs are mere paper 
entities; many others, vehicles for personal 
aggrandisement or enrichment. That said, the 
fl owering of so many good, committed, focused, 
civil society initiatives has contributed immensely 
to the nurturing of a democratic ethos in India. 
The space vacated by the state has at least been 
partially fi lled by individuals and groups motivated 
by a fi ne kind of disinterested idealism.
V
The brutal side to globalisation is manifested 
in the intensification of mining operations. 
But there is also a benign side to globalisation. 
In the tribal districts of Orissa, the opening of the Indian 
economy has encouraged short-term speculation via 
forms of resource extraction that are socially damaging 
as well as environmentally polluting. On the other 
hand, in cities with a skilled work force, such as 
Bangalore or Hyderabad, economic liberalisation 
has generated a  huge amount of wealth through 
the provision of high-end, high-value services such 
as software and biotechnology. The proceeds from 
mining go to a privileged few; the proceeds from 
service industries to very many more. At the same 
time, the software boom has generated a new wave 
of philanthropy, with the promoters of companies 
like WIPRO and INFOSYS contributing handsomely to 
NGOs working on enhancing the quality and reach 
of education and health care in rural India. 
For too long the creative energies of the Indian 
entrepreneur was suppressed by what C. 
Rajagopalachari memorably called the ‘license-permit-
quota-raj’. In the early years of independence, Indian 
industry perhaps needed protection – it certainly 
demanded it. The Bombay Plan of 1944, endorsed by 
G. D. Birla and J. R. D. Tata among others, asked both 
for curbs on foreign investment and for an enhanced 
role for the state. India had once been colonised by a 
Western multinational corporation – having, at last, 
gained its freedom, it intended to keep it. At the 
same time, Indian capitalists lacked the capital and 
knowhow to invest in sectors such as steel, power, 
roads, and ports. They were thus content to focus on 
the manufacture and distribution of consumer goods, 
leaving capital goods and infrastructure to the state.
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The time to liberalise the Indian economy was 
the late 1960s. A manufacturing base was 
now in place; so, too, was a steady supply of 
skilled technicians and engineering graduates. 
However, for reasons of political expediency, the Prime 
Minister of the day, Mrs Indira Gandhi, chose instead 
to strengthen the stranglehold of the state over the 
economy. Key sectors such as coal and petroleum were 
nationalised. The licensing procedure in sectors still 
open to the private sector was at once made more 
arbitrary and more stringent. Those industrialists who 
knew how to massage political egos or hand over 
bribes had an advantage over those who trusted  their 
entrepreneurial abilities alone. 
The 1970s was verily the lost decade, in a political as 
well as economic sense (this was also the decade of 
the Emergency, of the nurturing of committed judges 
and bureaucrats, and, on the non-Congress side, of 
the elevation of street protest over the procedures of 
democratic deliberation). Government policies became 
somewhat more business-friendly in the 1980s; and, 
at last, more market-friendly in the 1990s. The surge 
in economic growth is a direct consequence of this 
greater (if also greatly belated) trust placed in the 
capabilities of the Indian entrepreneur. Along with 
software, other sectors such as telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals, motorised vehicles and air transport 
have also made impressive strides in recent years.
The growth in investment and productive capacity 
has generated many jobs, and, through them, a 
substantial and rapidly expanding middle class. The 
term ‘middle class’ is very elastic, of course. Defi ned 
more capaciously, it may embrace some 200 million 
Indians; defi ned more rigorously, perhaps half that 
number. At any rate, there has been a distinct 
embourgeoisement of Indian society, with millions 
of previously working-class families now qualifying 
as belonging to the middle class.
There remain, of course, very many more Indians who 
still count as poor. Here, again, the estimates vary widely 
– roughly 300 million if one goes by offi cial fi gures, 
perhaps twice that number if one adopts more stringent 
criteria. There are thus two nations, living side by side. 
In the words of Amartya Sen, the fi rst India lives a lot 
like California, the second (and more populous) India 
a lot like sub-Saharan Africa. 
Marxist ideologues claim that one is the consequence 
of the other – that many Indians have recently 
become prosperous only because many other Indians 
are still poor. This is a gross simplifi cation. A more 
nuanced, and more accurate, way to understand 
these differences in income and status is to interpret 
them through the lens of culture and geography. 
A certain kind of Indian, with a certain kind of 
social or caste background, living in a certain kind 
of concentrated settlement, and in certain states of 
India, is likely to be better off than Indians of other 
social backgrounds and other residential locations in 
other states. 
One consequence of market-led economic growth 
shall be to accentuate these differences. Since upper 
castes tend to have higher levels of education and 
greater mobility across India, they are likely to garner 
the most profi table jobs. Since well-developed regions 
have a reputation for being rich in skills and open to 
innovation, the bigger investors will fl ock to them. Since 
cities have more resources and better infrastructure 
than small towns and villages, they will continue to 
get the bulk of new investment. In this manner, the 
already substantial gap between Bangalore and rural 
Karnataka, south India and eastern India, city-dwellers 
and country-folk, will grow even larger.
These inequalities of income and status are made 
more striking by their magnifi cation by the media, 
with its breathless worship of wealth and success. 
A leading newspaper routinely speaks of the India 
that wants to march ahead allegedly being kept back 
by the other India that refuses to come with them. 
There is a kind of Social Darwinism abroad, where 
the new rich promiscuously parade their wealth, 
while insinuating that the poor are poor because they 
deserve to be poor. 
Rising inequalities have historically been part of 
the growth process all across the world. In the 
early phase of industrialisation, the gap between 
the rich and the poor widens. Over time, however, 
these inequalities tend to come down. That, at any 
rate, was the experience of Europe and America. 
Will later industrialisers such as China and India 
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also follow the same route? In India one cannot 
be unduly optimistic. One reason that inequalities 
tapered off in the West was because their 
governments worked effectively towards providing 
equality of opportunity. The contributions of the 
European welfare state in providing decent health 
care and education to its citizens are well known. 
Less acknowledged, perhaps, is the part played in 
levelling inequalities by the outstanding system of 
public schools and publicly funded universities in the 
United States. 
The situation in India is all too different. The inequalities 
in access to good education and health care are 
immense. The school my children went to in Bangalore 
is world-class; the school run by the state a few yards 
down the road is worse than third-rate. I can avail of 
top-quality health-care, by paying (admittedly, through 
my nose); my house help must go to the local quack 
instead. To address these disparities, outstanding 
work has been done by social workers in the fi elds 
of primary education and health care. Brave, selfl ess, 
utterly patriotic Indians have worked 24/7 to get slum 
and low caste children into school, and to provide 
them with protection against dangerous diseases. 
Ultimately, though, the scale of the problem is so 
immense that their work can only very partially make 
up for the apathy and corruption of the state. For 
only a properly functioning state can equalise the life 
chances of all Indians, whether men or women, high, 
middle or low caste, Hindus or Muslims, northerners 
or southerners. 
In the West, the bulk of the population resides in 
the middle class. Will this ever happen in India? The 
prospect is uncertain, for two reasons. The fi rst has 
been alluded to, the palpable failure of the state to 
provide education and health care to all its citizens. 
The second is the environmental constraint. Eighty 
years ago, Mahatma Gandhi had pointed to the 
unsustainability, at the global level, of the Western 
model of economic development. ‘God forbid, he 
wrote, ‘that India should ever take to industrialisation 
after the manner of the West. The economic 
imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) 
is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation 
of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, 
it would strip the world bare like locusts’.
With India, China too is trying to ape the West, 
attempting to create a mass consumer society 
whose members can all drive their own cars, live 
in their own air-conditioned homes, eat in fancy 
restaurants and travel to the ends of the earth 
for their family holidays. Will these Chinese and Indian 
consumers collectively strip the world bare like locusts? 
Between them, they have set off a new scramble for 
Africa, stripping or at least strip-mining that unhappy 
continent to fuel their ever-growing appetite for 
resources. They have also consolidated the control of 
a brutal military junta in Myanmar, putting their own 
selfi sh interests in minerals and energy well ahead of 
the elementary human rights of the Burmese people.
The environmental challenges posed by the economic 
rise of China and India are of three kinds. First, at 
the global level, is the threat of rapid and irreversible 
climate change due to the accumulation of greenhouse 
gases. Second, at the regional or continental level, are 
the environmental (and social) costs of the ecological 
footprint of China and India outside their own national 
borders. The West has for some time worked to 
relocate its dirty industries to the Third World, passing 
on the costs to the poor and the powerless. In the 
same manner, the externalities of Indian and Chinese 
consumers will be increasingly borne by the people 
of other lands.
The third challenge is that posed to the environments 
of these countries themselves. Chinese cities have the 
highest rates of air pollution in the world. Rivers such 
as the Ganga and the Jamuna are effectively, dead. 
India and China both have unacceptably high levels of 
air and water pollution. They have also witnessed, in 
recent years, the large-scale depletion of groundwater 
aquifers, the loss of biodiversity, the destruction of 
forests, and the decimation of fi sh-stocks.
There are two stock responses to the environmental 
crisis in India. One is to hope, or pray, that in time and 
with greater prosperity we will have the money to clean 
up our surroundings. The other is to see ecological 
degradation as symptomatic of the larger failure of 
modernity itself. The fi rst response is characteristic 
of the consuming classes; the second, that of the 
agrarian romantic, who believes that India must live 
only in its villages, and indeed, that  the majority of 
Indians are happy enough to live on in their villages.
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Both responses are deeply wrong-headed. Contra 
the rural romantic, life among the peasantry can be 
nasty, brutish and short. Most Indian villagers would 
cheerfully exchange a mud hut for a solid stone house, 
well-water for clean piped-water, kerosene lanterns 
for steady and bright tube lights. The living standards 
of the majority of Indians can and must be enhanced. 
At the same time, the living standards of the most 
wealthy Indians must be moderated.
The demands placed on the earth by the poor and 
excluded are disproportionately low; the demands 
placed by those with cars and credit cards excessively 
high. A rational, long-range, sustainable strategy 
of development has to fi nd ways of enhancing the 
resource access of those at the bottom of the heap 
while checking the resource demands of those in 
positions of power and advantage.
Once, the media played a catalytic role in promoting 
environmental awareness. However, when liberalisation 
got underway and the economy began to show higher 
rates of growth, there was an anti-environmental 
backlash. Now, environmentalists are portrayed as 
party-poopers, as spoilers who do not want India to 
join the ranks of the Great Powers of the world. In 
response to these criticisms, and sensible also of the 
pressures of commercial advertisers, most newspapers 
laid off their environment correspondents or perhaps 
sent them to cover the stock market instead.
The campaigning journalist Anil Agarwal once wrote 
of the environmental debate as being ‘beyond pretty 
trees and tigers’. In India, at least, the state and fate 
of the natural environment is intimately linked to 
livelihood and survival. Without sustainable irrigation 
practices, Indian farmers cannot assure themselves a 
long-term future. Without decent public transport 
and energy conservation, India will be beholden to 
the whims and fancies of countries with more oil 
than ourselves. Without clean air and safe drinking 
water, our children will be far less healthy than we 
want them to be.
However, in the eyes of the new, excessively market-
friendly media, the environment is only about pretty 
trees and tigers. They wish their readers to live 
resource-intensive lifestyles and yet be able to glory 
in the beauties of the wild. They cannot, or will not, 
see that the one imperils the other. Nor will they 
acknowledge the persistence and signifi cance of more 
local, less glamorous, environmental issues – such as the 
state of the air and the water, the conservation of energy, 
the provision of safe and affordable housing. These 
issues affect the lives of hundreds of millions of Indians. 
However, by succumbing so readily to the cult of 
wealth and celebrity, the media can fi nd no space 
for them.
The market is good at producing consumer goods 
effi ciently and cheaply, and at distributing them quickly 
and widely. But the market cannot provide fair access 
to education or health care. And the operations of 
the market can actually promote environmental 
destruction. The value of clean air and species diversity 
cannot be assessed in monetary terms. Energy and 
transport policies that are suitable from the point of 
view of a city, a state, or a nation, cannot be designed 
by a single private enterprise. A sustainable path of 
economic development thus depends crucially on a 
far-seeing state as well as a vigilant media. Tragically, 
India currently has neither.
VI
For very many years, the Indian experiment with 
nationhood and democracy was written off by Western 
observers. Indians were informed, through a series 
of premature obituaries, that our country was too 
diverse to be a single nation, and too poor to be run 
on democratic lines. To be sure, the nation was scarcely 
stable or secure – it lurched, as it were, from crisis to 
crisis, from riot to assassination to border confl ict to 
open war. But somehow, India survived; somehow 
(and despite the Emergency) it even stayed democratic.
When, fi nally, did foreign scholars and travelers 
concede that the Republic of India was here to stay? 
I think it was the year 1997 that marked the end of 
Western skepticism about the fate of India. That year, 
this unnatural nation and unlikely democracy offi cially 
marked fi ve full decades of its existence.
Now, of course, we are told, not that India is 
going down the tube, but that, with China, we 
are one of the rising superpowers of the century. 
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This newer, more hopeful kind of prophecy is eagerly 
seized upon by two kinds of Indians: those who enjoy 
political power, and those who own vast amounts of 
wealth. Both see the bestowing of superstardom as 
not very much more than their due.
This new, self-confi dent, even arrogant India is on 
display most prominently in two cities, Bangalore 
and New Delhi. The latter is, for me, the place 
where the archives are; but for most others, it is the 
political capital of India. Bangalore is, from my narrow 
perspective, merely my home town, but in the eyes 
of the world it is the centre of a rising Asian giant’s 
showpiece software industry. Not unexpectedly, the 
power elite of both cities are marked by a very high 
sense of self-regard. In the case of the Delhi politicians, 
this self-praise is essentially unearned. The self-esteem 
of the new generation of Indian entrepreneurs, on 
the other hand, is based on their own hard work and 
achievement. Given an opening, they have seized it; 
by building world-class companies on Indian soil with 
Indian capital and Indian workers. But here, too, there 
is a tendency for self-regard to shade into hubris. 
Having so successfully nurtured a private company, 
they see no reason why they cannot be part of a very 
successful nation-state, without quite understanding 
that the leap from one to the other involves agencies 
and processes of which they sometimes have little 
understanding and over which they often have no 
control. 
The imagination of the Indian elite is constructed 
around these twin poles: one political, the other 
economic. But to fl y from Bangalore to Delhi, and 
back, is literally to fl y over a serious challenge to the 
emergence of India as a global superpower. Obscured 
from the bird in the sky is the Naxalite insurgency 
in central India, which covers at least one-tenth of 
the country’s surface, and which has at its core the 
sufferings and discontent of tens of millions of tribal 
people.
For the middle class, the threat from the left is wholly 
hidden. They do not see or confront it in their daily lives. 
On the other hand, they do know of the threat from the 
right. Yet they tend to disregard it. Some middle class 
Indians think that India should be a Hindu state anyway. 
Others believe – or hope – that  with economic 
modernisation the religious extremism of the BJP 
will fade, with the party becoming an Indian version 
of the German Christian Democrats.
In the case of the dumbing down of the media, 
the middle class has been an active collaborator. 
So, too, with the degradation of the environment, 
whose links to their own lifestyles are scarcely 
understood or commented upon. The disparity 
between the rich and the poor is too obvious to be 
ignored; still, the hope is that with an even freer play 
of market forces, those presently at the bottom of the 
pyramid will come to occupy its middle ranks. 
The one challenge to superstardom that is most clear to 
the consuming classes is the corruption and corrosion 
of the democratic Centre. They are witness to the 
shocking amoralism of our political class; and subject 
in their daily lives to its consequences. The market, 
and their own ability to pay, can in part insulate them 
from the breakdown of public services. They can 
trust the courier service instead of the post offi ce, 
get themselves a mobile phone and forget about the 
land line, and have a stand-by generator in case of 
a power-cut. And yet, every now and then, they are 
served a powerful reminder that they remain at the 
mercy of the malfunctioning state. Time is money, 
never more so when one is caught for hours in a 
traffi c jam caused either by the precedence given to 
a politician’s convoy or by the fact that the surface 
of a major road has suddenly caved in.
In the short-term, at any rate, the Indian political 
class can only get more corrupt, and the Indian state 
more ineffi cient.  Multi-party coalition governments 
are already the norm in the Centre; they will become 
increasingly common in the states. As the price of 
joining a coalition led by one of the major parties, 
the smaller formations demand the most lucrative 
Ministries. In the current, fragmented, political 
scenario, short-term rent-seeking will take precedence 
over long-term policy formulation. This shall be true 
of governments in the states, as well as at the Centre.
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VII
The challenge of the Naxalites; the insidious presence 
of the Hindutvawadis; the degradation of the once 
liberal and upright Centre; the increasing gap 
between the rich and the poor; the trivialisation of 
the media; the unsustainability, in an environmental 
sense, of present patterns of resource consumption; 
the instability and policy incoherence caused by 
multi-party coalition governments – these are seven 
reasons why India will not become a superpower. 
To this, so-to-speak objective judgment of the 
historian, I will now add the subjective desires of a 
citizen – which is that India should not even attempt 
to become a superpower.
In my view, International Relations cannot be made 
analogous to a competitive examination. The question 
is not who comes fi rst or second or third, whether 
judged in terms of Gross National Product, number 
of billionaires in the Forbes or Fortune lists, number 
of Olympic gold medals won, size of largest aircraft 
carrier operated, or power of most deadly nuclear 
weapon owned. 
We should judge ourselves not against the 
achievements, real or imagined, of other countries, 
but in the light of our own norms and ideals. The jurist 
Nani Palkhivala once remarked that ‘India is a third-
class democracy with a fi rst-class Constitution’. Both 
parts of the equation remain as he stated them. In 
conception we are a unique nation, unique for refusing 
to reduce Indian-ness to a single language, religion, 
or ideology, unique in affi rming and celebrating the 
staggering diversity found within our borders (and 
beyond them). The Constitution defi ed the Laws 
of Manu by giving women equal rights with men. 
It violated thousands of years of social practice by 
abolishing Untouchability. It refused, despite the 
provocations of bigots of both religions, to make 
India into a ‘Hindu Pakistan’. And it challenged the 
evidence and logic of history by giving even unlettered 
adults the power to choose those who would represent 
them in legislatures and in Parliament.
That is the ideal, still fi rst class; and then there is the 
practice, mostly third-class. The equality of women and 
low castes is denied in homes and villages across the land. 
There are chauvinists who privilege one language, 
setting upon those Indians who choose to speak another. 
There are religious fundamentalists who likewise harass 
and persecute those whose Gods are different from 
theirs. There are allegedly ‘democratic’ politicians who 
abuse their oath of offi ce and work only to enrich 
themselves; as well as self-described ‘revolutionaries’ 
who seek to settle arguments by the point of the gun. 
It was, I think, Jawaharlal Nehru who pointed out 
that India was home to all that is truly disgusting 
as well as truly noble in the human condition. 
The nobility and the disgustingness were abundantly 
on display in his day, as they are in ours. Contemporary 
India is home to pluralists and democrats as well as 
to fanatics and sectarians; to selfl ess social workers 
as well as to greedy politicians; to honest and upright 
offi cials as well as to offi cials who are time-servers; 
to capitalists who distribute their wealth quietly and 
widely as well as to those who seek only to publicly 
and provocatively display it. To redeem the Republic, 
to bring the practice of Indian democracy closer to 
the ideals of Indian nation-hood, is to valorise and 
support the fi rst kind of Indian rather than the second.
Six months after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, my 
teacher, Dharma Kumar, wrote a short essay entitled 
‘India as a Nation-State’. Here, she took issue both 
with left-wing activists who thought the Indian state 
too strong, and with Hindu chauvinists who thought 
it too weak. She rejected both positions by affi rming 
the inclusive and democratic idea of India upheld by 
its founders. As she put it, ‘instead of deploring our 
lack of homogeneity we should glory in it. Instead of 
regarding India as a failed or deformed nation-state 
we should see it as a new political form, perhaps even 
as a forerunner of the future. We are in some ways 
where Europe wants to be, but we have a tremendous 
job of reform, of repairing our damaged institutions, 
and of inventing new ones.’
I have myself been fortunate in being witness to 
the work of many Indians who have sought to 
repair or redeem our institutions. I think of groups 
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like the Association of Democratic Reform, which succeeded in making the criminal records and assets of 
politicians public; or like Pratham, which works closely with the state governments to improve our public 
education system. I think of Ela Bhatt and Chandi Prasad Bhatt, respectively the grandmother and grandfather 
of modern social activism in India. I think of the scientists Obaid Siddiqui and Padmanabhan Balaram, who 
have nurtured world-class, non-hierarchical, research laboratories in a funds-scarce, anti-intellectual, and deeply 
inegalitarian society. I think, too, of my exact contemporaries and fellow PhDs Jean Dreze and Mihir Shah, who 
could have enjoyed comfortable careers as teachers and writers, but who chose instead to become full-time 
activists, and bent their expertise to making the Government of India more responsive to the lives and interests 
of the rural poor. And, since I have myself contributed in this essay to the growing cynicism about public offi cials, 
I think, fi nally, of the outstanding former Governor of West Bengal, Gopalkrishna Gandhi, whose understanding 
of and empathy with the citizens of his state was, in all senses of the word, exemplary.
The groups and individuals mentioned in the preceding paragraph are, of course, merely illustrative. The 
work that they and others like them undertake is rarely reported in the mainstream media. It is far easier 
to speak of a wholesale, structural transformation, to identify one single variable that, if acted upon, 
will take India up and into the straight high road to superstardom. Among the one-size-fi ts-all solutions 
on offer are those promoted by the Naxalites, whose project is to make India into a purer, that is to say 
more regimented, version of Communist China; by the RSS and the BJP, who assure the Hindus that 
if they rediscover their religion they will (again) rule the world; and by the free-market ideologues, who seek 
to make India into an even more hedonistic version of the United States of America. 
To follow the Naxalites is to plunge India into decades of civil war; to follow the Hindu right to persecute 
and demonise large numbers of one’s own countrymen; to follow the market fundamentalists to intensify 
the divisions between the consuming and the surviving classes (and to destroy the global environment in 
the process). Rather than nurture or act upon these Utopian fantasies, the Indian patriot must focus instead 
on the tasks of gradual and piecemeal reform. We need to repair, one by one, the institutions that have 
safeguarded our unity amidst diversity, and to forge, also one by one, the new institutions that can help us 
meet the fresh challenges of the twenty-fi rst century. It will be hard, patient, slow work – that is to say, the 
only kind of work that is ever worth it. ■
